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On 15 November 1972, the European PaD[ament adopted a resolution 
drawn up by Mr Radoux on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee, on 
preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
In paragraph 5 of this resolution Parliament instructed its Political 
Affairs Committee to follow the progress of the negotiations closely and to 
report back to it at the appropriate time. 
By letter dated 10 May 1973 the President of the European Parliament 
confirmed these instructions to the Political Affairs Committee. 
At its meetings of 4/5 September, 3/4 December 1974, 8/9 January, 
23/24 January and 5/6 February 1975, the committee considered the draft 
report; at the last of these meetings it adopted the motion for a 
resolution together with the explanatory statement unanimously with one 
abstention. 
The following were present: Lord Gladwyn, vice-chairman and acting 
chairman; Mr Radoux, vice-chairman and rapporteur; Mr Antoniozzi 
(deputizing for Mr Colin), Mr Behrendt, Mr Alfred Bertrand, Mr Corterier, 
Sir Douglas Dodds-Parker, Mr Kirk, Mr Klepsch (deputizing for Mr Jahn), 
Mr Ligios (deputizing for Mr Andreotti), Mr LUcker, Mr Noe (deputizing for 
Mr Giraudo), Mr Petersen (deputizing for Mr Durieux), Mr Scelba, 
Mr Scott-Hopkins, Mr S~nale (deputizing for Mr Faure), Mr Terrenoire 
(deputizing for Mr Bourges). 
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A 
The Political Affairs Committee hereby submits to the European 
Parliament the following motion for a resolution, together with 
explanatory statement : 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
The European Parliament, 
welcoming all initiatives likely to ease tensions and improve 
cooperation between all States in Europe. 
taking note of the progress achieved so far in the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
desirous of establishing closer commercial, economic and industrial 
relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. 
- considering that further progress is still required, particularly 
in the field of freer movement of people and ideas, 
reaffirming that the results of the CSCE can in no way inhibit the 
progress of the Nine towards European Union, 
- stressing, therefore, in the context of the principle of the 
inviolability of frontiers in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, the right of individual Member States of the European 
Community to change their boundaries by peaceful means and to create 
a political entity (European Union), 
- considering that the documents to be approved in the final stages 
of the CSCE should be drawn up during the present stage• 
- expressing its satisfaction at the degree of political unity 
demonstrated by the nine governments of the European Community in 
the CSCE negotiations, resulting in common policies and positions 
concerning the issues negotiated, 
- having regard to the report of its Political Affairs Committee 
(Doc.485 /74) 
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1. Urges the governments of the nine Member States of the European 
Community, having due regard to the legal bases and objectives of 
the Rome and Paris Treaties; 
to insist, in order that agreement may be reached in the third 
phase of the CSCE: 
(a) that a greater balance should be achieved within the 
First, Second and Third Committees; 
(b) that, with that aim in view, further progress should be 
made in the First Committee on questions relating to 
security in Europe and in the Third Committee on cooperation 
in humanitarian and cultural fields; 
to ensure that any follow-up negotiations concerning issues for 
which competence has been transferred from the Member States to the 
Community are conducted by the Commission of the European Communities; 
and 
2· Requests its President to forward this resolution and 
report of its Committee to the Council and Commission of the 
European Communities, and to the Parliaments and Governments of the 
Member States. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. On 6 July 1972 the Parliament referred to the Political Committee a 
Motion for a Resolution submitted by Mr Berkhouwer on behalf of the Liberal 
and Allies Group, concerning the preparation of the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (Doe. 101/72). This Motion was considered by 
the Political Committee at its meetings of 12 September, 19 and 22 October 
and 9 November 1972. A Rapporteur was appointed by the Political Committee 
on 17 October 1972. On 9 November 1972 the Political Committee adopted a 
Motion for a Resolution which the Rapporteur submitted to it. This Motion 
instructed the Political Committee to follow the negotiations concerning 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and to follow, also, 
the development of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks (MBFR) at 
Vienna. The Motion was adopted by the Parliament on 15 November 1972. 
2. Since the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the 
Mutual and Balanced Ferae Reduction negotiations at Vienna are both large 
and complex subjects a separate draft report is being submitted to the 
Political Committee on each negotiation. This draft report concerns the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. A separate draft report 
on MBFR has already been circulated to members of the Political Committee 
in March 1974 (PE 36.476). 
3. In the context of these two negotiations the attention of members is 
drawn to the debate held in the Parliament on 15 January 1974 on oral ques-
tions numbers 101/73 and 138/73 on the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, in which Mr Scheel participated, as Chairman of the 
Council, and also to the first sentence of paragraph 8 of the European 
Identity paper agreed at the Copenhagen Summit meeting of 14 December 1973 
which stated: "The Nine, one of whose essential aims is to maintain peace, 
will never succeed in doing so if they neglect their own security." 
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I I. BACKGROUND 
4. Proposals to hold the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE) can be traced back to 1954 when the Soviet Union proposed 
a European Security Conference (1) to consider the establishment of a 
collective security agreement. Mr Molotov's ideas were seen by the West 
as an attempt to hold up the ratification of the Paris agreements by which 
West Germany was rearmed and integrated into the newly created Western 
European Union and into NATO. After the creation of the Warsaw Pact as 
an Eastern response to the establishment of WEU and German re-armament, 
Mr Bulganin proposed,at the Geneva summit of 1955, the idea of a collective 
security agreement to replace the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. 
Following this the late 1950s saw many different proposals for "disengage-
ment". 
5. The 1958-59 East-West negotiations broke down over the contradictory 
approaches of East and West concerning the German problem. Whereas the 
West insisted on reunification, the East made the existence of two German 
states their point of departure. 
6. A new invitation to hold a European Security Conference, launched by 
Mr Rapacki in December 1964, was considered by the West to be aimed at 
disrupting the negotiations then proceeding within NATO on the creation of 
Multilateral Nuclear Force, at questioning the American presence in Europe, 
and at sowing political discord within the Western Alliance. 
(1) For many years the Eastern European countries, which have been 
the main promoters of the Conference idea, referred to the 
"European Security Conference" or the "pan-European" or 
"all-European conference." In the US and Canada the Conference 
was more normally referred to as the "Conference on European 
Security" so as not to imply the exclusion of the US and Canada. 
More recently the NATO ~ountries devised the term Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe which has been adopted by 
all the parties concerned. 
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7. In January 1965 the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee 
approved the Polish initiative, and subsequently the idea of convening a 
Conference to discuss collective security in Europe was explored in 
bilateral talks between some of the smaller NATO and Warsaw Pact countries 
and in the "Group of Nine" and then the "Group of Ten" (1) • Statements 
by Mr Gromyko and Mr Brezhnev in April 1966 showed a renewed Soviet interest 
in the holding of a European Security Conference. 
8. The Group of Nine/Ten met several times to explore initiatives that 
might be taken to promote detente in Europe. However, following the 
failure of attempts at reconciliation after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
the experiment of the Group of Ten came to an end, at least for the time 
being. 
(1) Set up following adoption by the UN General Assembly in December 
1965 of Resolution 2129 (XX) • The Nine countries which 
originally constituted themselves into an informal grouping 
during 1966 were Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, 
Hungary, Roumania, SWeden, and Yugoslavia. In 1967 the 
Netherlands joined the Group which thus became'~e Group of Ten•. 
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II I. DEVELOPMENT OF MAJOR THEMES 
9. Following the publication by the Warsaw Pact of a "Declaration on 
Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe" at Bucharest in July 1966, 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact developed a diplomatic ping-pong match of 
proposals and counter-proposals concerning the holding of a security 
conference. Some non-aligned and neutral countries (especially Austria, 
Finland and Switzerland) also played an active part in making proposals 
concerning the Conference. Whereas the Warsaw Pact took the original 
initiatives concerning the holding of CSCE, since December 1967 NATO has 
seen the overall improvement of East-West relations as one of its main 
political aims. 
10. It may be useful to examine briefly the development by both sides of 
the main themes relating to the holding of a Conference. These themes 
include: dissolution of the blocs; participation; other pre-conditions 
and agenda items. 
Dissolution of the Blocs 
11. One of the main proposals made by the Eastern European countries in 
the opening shots in the campaign over CSCE was the simultaneous abolition 
of the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, as proposed in the Bucharest 
Declaration. The implementation of this proposal would, so it is 
considered in the West, be very advantageous to the USSR. Whilst the 
dismantling of NATO would mean that the West would lose its integrated 
defence system, the results: on the Eastern European side would not be 
comparable since there exists a network of bilateral agreements between 
the Soviet Union and the Governments of Eastern European countries which 
enables the USSR to station forces and missiles in the other Pact countries 
quite apart from the facilities she has to do so-under the Warsaw Pact 
itself. Thus even if the blocs were dissolved these bilateral arrangements 
would remain unless special additional steps were taken to abrogate them. 
It is also considered in the West that the Warsaw Pact, if disbanded, 
could be reactivated rapidly, whilst the reconstitution of NATO would be 
a long and difficult task. 
Participation 
12. Until the Budapest meeting of June 1970 the Warsaw Pact countries did 
not make it clear whether the US and Canada would be welcomed at CSCE. 
Tho ambiguity concerning the North American presence at a Conference was 
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widely interpreted in NATO circles as being an attempt to detach the 
North American from the European wing of NATO. In the West there were 
further doubts as to whether the US and Canada would be able to participate 
in any standing East-West institution set up by the Security Conference. 
In practice the US and Canada have taken part in all stages of CSCE, so 
far, and there is little doubt that IF a standing institutien~ere to be 
established the two North American countries would play a full part in it. 
13. On their side the Eastern E~opean countries have always insisted 
that the German Democratic Republic should participate on equal terms with 
other countries taking part. 
Agenda 
14. The first formal proposals concerning the agenda for CSCE were made by 
the Warsaw Pact at Prague in October 1969 when it suggested two items: 
(a) the ensuring of European Security and the renunciation of the use or 
threat of force in the mutual relations of European states~ and (b) the 
expansion of commercial, economic, scientific, technical and cultural 
relations on the basis of equal rights for the purpose of developing 
political cooperation between European states. At the Budapest meeting 
of June 1970 the Warsaw Pact added a third item to its agenda proposals: 
the establishment by the Conference of "an appropriate organ of all 
interested countries for questions of security and cooperation in Europe". 
15. At its Ministerial meeting in Rome in May 1970, NATO made two agenda 
proposals which, although similar in nature to the two initial Warsaw 
Pact proposals, were significantly different in emphasis. These two 
items were: (a) the principles that should govern relations between 
states, including the renunciation of force~ and (b) the development of 
international relations with a view to contributing to the freer movement 
of people, ideas and information and to developing cooperation in the 
cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well as in the 
field of human environment. In December 1969 NATO had already suggested 
that an agenda item for an eventual CSCE might be cooperation concerning 
oceanography, but that proposal soon dropped by the wayside. 
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16. Following the multilateral preparatory discussions at Helsinki, all 
states participating in the preparation of CSCE agreed on the agenda 
(which was to be adopted at the initial ministerial stage) which should 
govern the work of the specialised Committees and Sub-committees during 
the second, expert stage and should be as follows: (a) questions relating 
to security in Europe: (b) cooperation in the fields of economics, 
science and technology and of the environment, and (c) cooperation in 
humanitarian and other fields. On the insistence of the NATO countries 
the Warsaw Pact proposal that the creation of a standing East-West body 
should constitute an agenda item was transformed into agreement - albeit 
reluctant on the part of the Warsaw Pact countries - that the questions 
concerning institutional follow-up to CSCE should be considered in the 
light of progress made on specific issues in the Committee stage. In 
effect it would be the hope of most Western countries that the question of 
follow-up could be agreed during the second stage so that a recommendatiOD 
on this subject - as on others - would be ready for submission to the third 
stage without the need for more substantive negotiation. 
Other Pre-conditions 
17. Apart from the pre-conditions established by the Warsaw Pact and 
NATO concerning participation, NATO demanded progress on two points as 
the condition for its advancing towards the multilateral preparation of 
CSCE. At their meeting in Rome, in May 1970, the Foreign Ministers of 
NATO stated that they would be ready to explore the possibilities of 
holding CSCE on condition that sufficient "progress" was recorded in: 
the discussions between the two parts of Germany; the separate sets of 
negotiations between the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Union 
and Poland; the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT); and, the 
Four-Power talks on Berlin. The signature of the two separate 
renunciation-of-force treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the USSR and Poland in 1970 seemed to go a long way towards 
fulfilling this condition. But the failure of the Western powers to 
obtain concessions from the Russians in the Berlin discussions led NATO 
to harden its posture concerning CSCE. Thus in December 1970 the 
North Atlantic Council stated that transition tu lhe multilatcr<ll 
preparation of CSCE would depend not merely on "progress" in but on a 
"satisfactory solution" to the Four-Power talks, whilst still requiring 
that "progress" be made in SALT and in the bilateral discussions between 
the two parts of Germany. The conclusion of the Four-Power talks on 
Berlin largely fulfilled this condition. 
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18. The most important condition, however, imposed by NATO for the holding 
of CSCE was that the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies should agree 
ether to the discussion of substantive military security issues in CSCE or 
in separate negotiations to be held in parallel with it. Since its 
June 1968 Reykjavik meeting NATO consistently urged the Warsaw Pact to 
hold negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. 
The events of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 delayed progress concerning 
Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions for a time, and, in any case, the 
initial Warsaw Pact reactions to the NATO proposal were unenthusiastic. 
However, after NATO had placed pressure on the Warsaw Pact to agree to 
discuss military security in Europe - in the form of force and arms 
reductions - as a quid pro guo for acceptance of the Eastern European 
proposal to hold CSCE, Mr Brezhnev, in speeches in Moscow and Tbilisi in 
March and May 1971 expressed Soviet readiness to negotiate force 
reductions. 
19. However, progress in launching MBFR remained slow. Fourteen members 
of the Atlantic Alliance appointed Mr Manlio Brosio, former Secretary 
General of NATO, to explore Soviet views on MBFR and report to the NATO 
Ministerial Council on Soviet attitudes. He waited in vain for a Soviet 
invitation to Moscow. But, following positive statements by Mr Brezhnev 
and Mr Kosygin in December 1971, the Political Consultative Committee of 
the Warsaw Pact gave general support, in Prague in January 1972, to the 
idea of force reductions declaring that an agreement to reduce foreign and 
indigenous forces and arms in Europe would strengthen European security. 
"Preparatory consultations relating to Central Europe" involving nineteen 
European states were held in Vienna from 31 January 1973 to 28 June of that 
year. Full negotiations on "mutual reduction of forces and armaments and 
associated measures in Central Europe" opened in Vienna at the end of 
October 1973 and these still continue. (1) 
(1) For details see Draft Report, by your Rapporteur, on "The mutual 
and balanced force reduction negotiations (MBFR)" (PE 36.476). 
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IV. MOTIVES 
20. It has been considered by at least some Western officials and 
commentators that major Soviet motives for impressing the holding of CSCE 
have included: 
(a) the multilateral recognition of the status guo and the Soviet 
position in Eastern Europe; 
(b) the division of NATO members, particularly the North American 
from the European; 
(c) the securing of the European flank of the Soviet Union at 
a time of crisis with China; 
(d) the diversion of Western European countries from moves to 
closer political or defence cooperation in favour of some kind 
of "all-European" cooperation; 
(e) an attempt to lull Western Europe into a state of euphoria 
in which it relaxes its political cohesion and military 
vigilance; 
(f) the acceleration of American disengagement from Western Europe; 
(g) an attempt to obtain Western economic and technological 
aid for the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries; 
(h) obtaining a greater degree of international recognition for 
the GDR. 
21. Further, some Western commentators consider that by the holding of 
CSCE and through follow-up to the Conference - particularly if this were 
to take the form of a standing East-West institution - the Soviet Union 
could, especially in the light of possible US force withdrawals from 
Europe, establish itself as THE major European power whilst making the 
role of the US and Canada in European affairs seem i~creasingly marginal. 
22. The list of alleged motives set out above is difficult to verify. 
Its nature is something of a "shopping list" resulting from different 
Western analyses which may be realistic or which may simply be pessimistic. 
It should be stressed that ~ of the alleged motives mentioned above 
are not contrary to Western European interests nor to European security. 
In addition it should be remembered that on the Western side - and in this 
context the Community must be mentioned - a series of objectives has been 
pursued, especially concerning 'the freer movement of people and ideas'. 
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23. Also some of the Eastern European countries have motives of their own, 
distinct from those of the Soviet Union, both in favour of hoJding CSCE 
and concerning the results they would like to see coming out of it. 
Roumania is an obvious instance of this, but it is not alone as is 
demonstrated by the special and obvious interests of the GDR in the 
Conference. 
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V. PREPARATION AND FORM OF CONFERENCE 
Preparation 
24. Before the multilateral preparatory talks started at Helsinki in 
November 1972 a number of proposals had been made concerning preparation 
and form of CSCE. Thus as early as December 1969 the then British 
Labour Government proposed the establishment of a Standing Committee on 
East-West Relations (SCEWER) which, acting as a forum for members of both 
blocs, together with the European neutral and non-aligned states could 
prepare CSCE (1} . The Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, in a television 
interview in January 1970, described the proposal as envisaging "permanent 
machinery for dealing with all the problems in Europe that we could solve, 
economic as well as political and military and the rest." 
25. The Belgian Government proposed that the Conference should be 
prepared by a "salon ouvert" formula, under which Ambassadors of the 
interested countries would meet informally at a neutral capital to evolve 
an agenda by mutual consent. Variants of this idea were suggested by 
the Finnish and Austrian Governments, and the Warsaw Pact countries, at 
their Budapest meeting in June 1970, proposed that the preparation of 
the Conference should be carried out by the "direct participation" of 
interested countries. At one stage the Hungarian Government urged the 
creation of a four-member preparatory group that might work out an 
agenda and a method for discussion, and a variant proposal was that a 
three-member group or "troika" might perform the same function. In July 
1970 President Kekkonen of Finland proposed that the Security Conference 
might take the form of a series of preparatory meetings leading ultimately 
to a full scale CSCE. In the event, following drawn out preliminary 
discussions within and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, all European 
countries, with the exception of Albania, accepted the Finnish Government's 
invitation to hold multilateral preparatory talks at Helsinki. These 
talks began in November 1972 and lasted until the opening ministerial 
phase of the Conference proper in July 1973. 
(1) SCEWER was proposed by the British Government as being adaptable 
to three alternative forms: (a) as a preparatory mechanism for 
a conference, as outlined above; (b) as a permanent follow-up 
institution to a conference; (c) as an alternative to a conference. 
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26. On the Western side, the US at first considered that the Conference 
should consist of two stages. First a preparatory stage at expert level, 
and, second, a ministerial phase to adopt a resolution and conclusions on 
condition - and only on condition - that the discussions of the experts 
had resulted in satisfactory substantive results. 
27. The French Government proposed that the Conference should be l1eld in 
three phases. A formal opening Ministerial round, a closed phase of 
expert work in Committees and a third ministerial phase to adopt conclusions. 
28. Whereas the NATO countries have, as a group, adopted the French 
approach, they have insisted both in the multilateral preliminary talks 
and during the first and second stages of CSCE at Helsinki and Geneva 
that the third, ministerial stage of the Conference should only take place 
if substantive progress is made by the experts in the second, Committee 
stage. (!)They have also insisted that follow-up be discussed only when 
its usefulness or non-utility (in their view) will be clearer. 
29. The original Soviet and Warsaw Pact view seemed to be that a single 
ministerial conference would be sufficient. However the Eastern European 
countries showed no objection to adopting the French approach though they 
have suggested that the final m~nisterial stage be at "summit" level. 
The Warsaw Pact countries are not, however, content with NATO insistence 
that the holding of the third Ministerial phase should be dependant on 
the achievement of "satisfactory" (in the Western view) results in the 
Committee stage. During the second phase at Geneva they have showed 
signs of wishing to reduce the importance and length of the committee 
stage so as to move on to the final phase. 
(l) Following the Nixon-Brezhnev talks in Moscow in July 1974 it seems as 
though the US position has shifted in favour of the Soviet ~dea of a. 
"summit" third stage. Does this mean that the US has lost ~nterest ~n 
trying to obtain substantive results in the Committee stage at Geneva? 
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VI. A PERMANENT INSTITUTION? 
30. The reluctance shown by the members of the Atlantic Alliance at 
Helsinki and Geneva to create a standing East-West institution to follow up 
any decisions that may be taken by the Conference is largely due to fears 
that such a body could permit the Soviet Union to become the major 
European power, particularly if the US were to significantly reduce 
its military presence in Europe (1) . It is also feared, in the West, 
that the establishment of a standing East-West body might lead to the 
creation of a new European Security system which would involve the 
dissolution of NATO. 
31. On the economic front fears have been expressed in Community circles 
that the Soviet Union and the Comecon countries might try to use a standing 
body in order to replace the EEC process of economic integration by a 
watered down form of all-European cooperation. Fears have also been 
expressed within governmental circles of the Nine that the USSR might try 
to use a standing East-West body to prevent the development of political 
and defence cooperation by the members of the Enlarged Community. It is 
fears of this order which have led the Western participants to insist, 
successfully, that the question of the establishment of a standing body 
should not be considered until its utility~ o~ otherwise, can be )ridged in 
the light of the progress made at Geneva by the expert committees. 
32. Nonetheless, some Western commentators consider that the creation of a 
standing East-West body could provide a useful basis for the development 
of new multilateral links between all countries taking part in CSCE (2). 
On the Eastern side, the Warsaw Pact has consistently urged, as an Agenda 
item of the Conference, the creation of a permanent East-West institution. 
(1) See for instance the speech of Mr Manlio Brosio of 17 November 
1970 to the WEU Assembly. 
(2) For specific proposals concerning the establishment of a standing 
East-West institution see: Timothy Stanley, ''A Conference on 
European Security?", the Atlantic Council of the Un~ted States, 
Washington 1970; Michael Palmer, "The Prospects for a European 
Security Conference", Chatham House/PEP, London 1971; F.A.M. 
Alting von Geusau, "Security and Cooperation in the Seventies", 
Chapter VI of "NATO and Security in the Seventies", Tilburg 1972; 
a Working-Group under the auspices of the International Peace 
Research Institute, Oslo, "Some institutional suggestions for a 
system of security and cooperation in Europe", Oslo 1972. 
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33. To the extent that the NATO countries consider that there should be 
any form of institutional follow-up at all, and even this is not yet clear, 
they ~ to consider that this should take a minimal form, such as 
occasional meetings of the Ambassadors of the interested countries in a 
selected capital. Some observers consider that the Economic Commission 
Europe at Geneva might provide a suitable clearing house for economic and 
commercial follow-up to CSCE. UNESCO, either in its present form or a 
European sub-organ of it, might be responsible for East-West cultural 
follow-up contacts and the Inter-Parliamentary Union is actively interested 
in exploring the possibilities of establishing an East-West parliamentary 
Assembly ("Euroform"). 
34. The reticence of the Community Nine and the NATO Fifteen concerning 
follow-up in no way implies, however, that the West is opposed to follow-up 
to the Conference as such. They argue that they would welcome follow-up 
but they do not consider that follow-up activities require new institutions -
at least not at first and not until a period of time has elapsed following 
CSCE, during which the utility of creating special institutional machinery 
can be assessed in the light of practical developments. 
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VII 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND CSCE 
Participation 
35. The first problem posed to the European Community by CSCE was that of 
participation. Although the German Government at one time suggested that 
the Community could "participate in an adequate fashion" in CSCE as a 
distinct identity the French Government opposed such a move and it was not 
lung before a consensus emerged by which the Member Governments (l) agreed 
that the solution should be that Community Member States should speak with 
one voice at CSCE in discussing matters within the competence of the 
Community. 
36. The practical form that this agreement took both in the multilateral 
preparatory and the first ministerial stages of CSCE was for the 
representative of the country which held the Chairmanship of the Council to 
act as spokesman for the other countries of the Community in setting out 
their joint position. This procedure appeared, however, inappropriate 
for the working of the Conference, especially concerning the commercial 
policy where exclusive competences of the Community were involved. Thus, 
by decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers of the Nine on 11 September 
1973 in Copenhagen and by the Council of the EEC on 20 September 1973 in 
Brussels, representatives of the Commission of the EEC have been 
incorporated into the delegation of the Nine countries holding the 
presidency of the Council in order to present the viewpoint of the Community. 
Preparation 
37. The main preparatory work by the Nine for CSCE has been carried out 
in the Political Committee (2 ) whic11, for this purpose, set up a Sub-Committee 
of officials instructed to cover the political aspects of the preparation 
( 1) At that stage the Six, but in close consultation with the four 
governments which were then hoping to become new members. 
(2) Officially the Political Committee of the Member States of the 
European Communities. 
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of CSCE and an Ad Hoc Group, in which the Commission is represented, 
which has worked on the economic aspects of CSCE. Joint meetings between 
the two groups have been held to discuss subjects which are of both 
political and economic significance, such as relations between the 
Community and Comecon. Rather more detailed arrangements, referred to 
later, have been made in preparing the work of the expert Committees 
in stage two. 
Liaison with the Atlantic Alliance 
38. There has been some concern within the Atlantic Alliance, particularly 
on the part of members of NATO which do not belong to the European Community, 
that the preparation of a joint position by the Nine concerning CSCE should 
not result in the adoption of significantly different postures by the 
Community and the Alliance on major points at issue. To ensure the 
harmonious development of their common viewpoints in both organisations the 
countries working in the Community's Political Committee have arranged that 
members of their national delegations to the North Atlantic Counci' (who 
work there on problems concerning CSCE) represent them at meetings of the 
Community's Political Committee and of its Sub-Committee and Ad Hoc Group 
within the framework of the political cooperation procedure, though the 
delegations are led by those responsible in national capitals. In this 
way a coordinated approach to CSCE has been worked out by the Eight (Ireland 
not being a member of NATO) in both organisations. NATO countries are 
kept aware of the attitudes of the Community and the Political Committee of 
the Nine is fully informed of the national viewpoints of other NATO allies. 
39. At an early stage during these institutional developments some 
observers speculated whether these ad hoc links between the Political 
Committee of the Nine and NATO might prejudice rather than favour the 
development of European political unity, wondering whether the Nine could 
speak with "a voice of their own" if their joint foreign policies were 
influenced from the very beginning of their formation by non-Member States 
in NATO. In practice, however it is the Nine which has played a more 
active and dominating role in the Helsinki and Geneva negotiations, since 
they started, than has the Atlantic Alliance. 
The Interests of the Community in CSCE ? 
40. The major interest of the European Community in CSCE is the 
relationship - or priority - between the development of integration by the 
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Nine and the development of overall East/West relations. Within the 
Community the Nine (overtly or implicitly) are agreed that 
whereas they are prepared to take positive steps in improving 
East/West cooperation such cooperation must take second place, wherever a 
conflict of interests might possibly arise, to the possibility for the 
Nine to develop whatever measures of integration they wish. Accordingly 
the Eastern European countries must realise that there is no 
incompatibility between Western European integration and all-European 
cooperation so long as it is accepted that, for Community members, the 
first of these two activi.ties has priority. 
41. If the countries of Eastern Europe use all-European cooperation, 
either at CSCE or in any follow-up that may develop, to try to block the 
Community integration process or to try to substitute all-Europe>n 
cooperation for it, the limits of what is possible in d~tente will be seen 
to be very narrow and the prospects for all-European cooperation will 
themselves, in consequence, be strictly limited. In this context Community 
integration must be held to include foreign affairs and defence if the Nine 
decide to push ahead in these two fields. 
42. The other major interest of the Community in CSCE is that if 
detailed follow-up negotiations are held on all-European cooperation in 
specific domains, these negotiations should be held with the Commission 
itself on behalf of the Nine on any matter concerning which member countries 
have handed over competence to the Community under the Treaties. This would 
apply whether follow-up negotiations are held within the framework of a 
new institution, whether they are held within the general framework of the 
Economic Commissim for Europe (in the trade sector) , or whether they are 
carried through on an ad hoc basis. Specific areas that would be directly 
concerned would include those covered by the common commercial policy, 
agriculture and some aspects of transport and energy policy. 
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VIII 
PHASE TWO OF CSCE 
Organisation of phase two 
43. The second stage of CSCE, held in Expert Committees and Sub-Committees 
at Geneva, is organised as follows. The recommendations of the multi-
lateral preliminary talks (l) are being considered in three Committees, 
• generally known as "baskets". Basket I is working on questions relating 
to security in Europe". Basket II is working on "cooperation in the fields 
of economics, of science and technology and of the environment". 
Basket Ill is concerned with "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields". 
44. The work of Basket I is divided between three Sub-Committees. The 
first Sub-Committee is charged with the task "of considering and stating 
in conformity with the purpose and principles of the United Nations those 
basic principles which each participating state is to respect and af ly in 
its relations with all other participating states irrespective of their 
political, economic or social systems, in order to ensure the peace and 
security of all participating states". (Helsinki Recommendation 17). 
The second Sub-Committee is concerned with what are known as confidence 
building measures, and the third Sub-Committee is concerned with the 
peaceful settlement of disputes. 
45. In Committee II the first Sub-Committee is concerned with commercial 
exchanges, the second with industrial cooperation and projects of common 
interest, the third ~ith science and technology, the fourth with problems 
of the environment and, finally, a fifth Sub-Committee is concerned with 
cooperation in other fields. 
46. The third basket has one Committee dealing with human contacts, and 
another with inforr.F"tion, the third with cooperation and exchanges in the 
field of culture and a fourth Sub-Committee dealing with cooperation and 
exchanges in the field of education. 
47. A Coordinating Committee (which does not constitute a separate 
"basket" or a further substantive Committee) deals with the organisation 
and day to day running of CSCE and is charged with considering follow-
up to the Conference, though - as has been stressed earlier - the NATO 
(1) "Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations", Helsinki 1973. 
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countries have been insistent that there should be no decision on follow-
up to the Conference until they can judge what degree of progress has been 
achieved in Commit.tee. 
Work of the three "Baskets" 
48. In the first "basket", or Committee I, the most important question 
dealt with so far has been that of the "inviolability" of frontiers. 
This concept has been raised and pushed hard by the Soviet Union and its 
Warsaw Pact allies which wish the States participating in CSCE to 
recognise the permanent nature of the present geographical frontiers in 
Europe. Although Western participants made a major concession by basically 
accepting the Eastern viewpoint at an early stage, the members of NATO 
have insisted, on their side, that the Soviet Union should recognise that 
in the Western view the "inviolability" of frontiers should not preclude 
the alteration of frontiers by peaceful means, notably as far as the 
eventual reunification of the two parts of Germany is concerned, and the 
eventual merging of national sovereignty by the Nine members of the 
European Community to form some kind of a single political entity. 
However, some rlestern observers consider that this major concession to the 
USSR was made prematurely and that the West should have demanded 
substantive concessions concerning human contacts and the liberalisation 
of information, in Committee III, before conceding this point. 
49. There has been little progress in Committee I in reaching agreement 
on "the principles" which should "ensure the peace and security of all 
participating states" as proposed by the Warsaw Pact States. Although 
paragraph 18 of the Helsinki "Final Recommendations" foresees that "the 
principles to be stated shall be included in a document of appropriate 
fdrm to be submitted by the Committee for adoption by the Conference", 
there is considerable confusion as to what and how many documents will be 
adopted by the conference. Thus, at present, all documents submitted to 
the conference (apart from the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki 
consultations) are merely working papers and have no official status, 
though there will clearly be a Declaration of Principles emerging from 
Committee I and a number of resolutions on various other subjects on the 
agenda. 
50. In Committee II, where some observers had hoped that considerable 
progress might be made on such subjects as joint ventures in industry 
across East/West frontiers, progress ~as been limited, though there has been 
some "illusion" of progress in comp<U":i,son with the near deadlock in 
- 24 - PE 37.572/ fin. 
"baskets" I and III. Even if the results of the work in "basket" II are 
not striking, the Nine consider them to be satisfactory to the extent that, 
in general, the rather modest requests they have made have been satisfied 
and Mr Destremau, replying for the Council, in the European Parliament, 
on 26 September 1974, to a question put by Mr Jahn even described the 
results so far obtained in Committee II as being "quite positive and 
encouraging". Most of the running in Committee II has been made by the 
West, and especially by the Nine. But despite the pressures generated 
by the energy crisis, the Soviet Union has remained reserved on the proposal 
of the Nine on "projects of common interest in the field of industrial 
cooperation", which is the subject in "basket" II concerning which least 
progress has been made. But there has been satisfactory progress of 
the proposal of the Nine on "business contacts" (l) and concerning their 
proposal on "the provision of economic and 
commercial information". Observers at Geneva consider that one of the 
main restraints on progress in "basket" II has been the negative spill-over 
from "baskets" I and III, especially from "basket" III where the Soviet 
Union has refused to make any real concessions on human contacts. (2) As 
noted above, the work of "basket" III is basically in deadlock and the 
Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies show practically no sign of being 
willing to make concessions concerning any of the substantive points 
under consideration. 
Chairmanship 
51. Quite apart from the political obstacles to progress in the three 
"baskets", there has been a technical obstacle which, according to some 
participants at least, has not helped the progress of stage two. This is 
the system of chairmanship used in both the three principal committees 
and in the sub-committees. The chairmanship rotates with each sitting 
of a committee or sub-committee so that there is no continuity of committee 
or sub-committee chairmen to provide firm guidance for the work of the 
conference. If a committee or a sub-co .. ittee holds two sittings on 
one day there is a different chairman for each of the morning and 
afternoon sessions. 
{1) Here the Nine developed a joint position with the United States 
{2) Though some observers consider that the Eastern European countries can 
hardly be expected to make concessions concerning the freer movement of 
persons across East/West frontiers or the liberalisation of information in 
Eastern Europe, since these points affect directly the ideology and 
internal political structure of Communist States. 
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sub-committee holds two sittings on one day there is a different chairman 
for each of the morning and afternoon sessions. 
52. Although CSCE is one of the largest international conferences ever 
to be held in Europe, its press coverage has been limited. This is 
probably largely due to the slow rhythm, of work of the conference, but 
the decision taken by the participating countries at Helsinki to exclude 
the press from committee and sub-committee meetings during the second 
stage is another reason why public opinion has not been well informed 
concerning either the issues at stake in CSCE or the negotiations concerning 
them. 
Participation of the Nine in the second stage 
53. How do the Nine organise their contribution to the second phase of 
CSCE at Geneva? Apart from their approach to CSCE as a whole, whi eh has 
been analysed earlier in this paper, their management of the day-to-day work 
of the committees and the sub-committees at Geneva can be divided into three 
parts. First, the general concertation of the positions of the nine Member 
States concerning the work of the three committees and the sub-committees. 
Second, the approach to work carried out in Committees I and III. Third, 
the approach to Committee II. 
54. The overall concertation of the positions of the Nine concerning 
both the organisation and the substance of stage two of CSCE is carried 
out in regular meetings of the Heads of Delegations of the Member States. 
When the second phase of CSCE opened, coordinating meetings of the Heads 
of Delegations were held on an almost daily basis, but it is now found 
that between two and three meetings a week of the Heads of Delegation, at 
Geneva, are sufficient. 
55. It is at these meetings of the Heads of Delegation, which are, in 
effect, an on-the-spot form of meetings of the Sub-Committee and the Ad Hoc 
Group of the Political Committee that the day-to-day approach to the work 
of Committees I and III is prepared. After the Nine have hammered out 
their attitudes to specific problems in discussion in Committees I and III 
a representative of the State holding the chairmanship of the Council, or, 
sometimes, spokesmen of other members of the Nine, will outline the 
"point of view" of the Nine in the Committee or the Sub-Committee concerned. 
Papers on specific points are tabled by two, three or four Member States -
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but only ,,,hen the Ni::te have agreed, between themselves, on the proposals 
outlined.. 
56. The most inter2sting aspects of the preparation of a common approach 
t.o CSCE by the Nir:.e can be found in Committee II. Here, because the 
subject m;;.tt<>r is economic cooperation, the Commission itself participates 
in th~ wor.Jr of th~ Committee and its Sub-Committe'2s. Representatives of 
-:.:r.~ C-:>mmission sit at the table in Committee II and. in the meetings of its 
Sub-Co~~ittees as part of the Delegation of the State holding the 
chai::::man~.hip of the Council. Moreover, th-:'! officials concerned are 
listed on the attendance sheet with their titles and grades as members of 
the Commission Secretariat. At first this gave rise to prot~sts from 
representatives of the Warsa~ Pact States, but since the Nine were 
resolute in recalling that it had already been decided at Helsinki, in 
the multilateral preparatory talks that each participating state would be 
free to compose its Delegation as it chose, these protests were overruled 
and, in light of the firmness shown by the Nine on this question, the 
presence of Commission officials in"Basket"II is now no longer challenged. 
Wherever appropriate the Commission's officials speak in the discussions 
in "Basket"II, and present statements representing the collective 
viewpoint of the Corrununity. 
57. Although there is no formal linkage between NATO and the Nine in the 
day-to-day management of CSCE by the Western participants, a high degree 
of coordination of the positions of NATO and the Nine is achieved, in 
practice, by the fact that those responsible for peparing the approach of 
the Nine are often the same individuals as those responsible for 
prepari~g a common NATO approach to the questions concerned, the 
delegations of the Eight regularly attending informal coordination 
meetings, both of the Nine and of the Fifteen. 
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IX 
.:iQYIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REA.CTIOUS •ro THE 
COMMUNITY 
58. Two main concerns shape the attitudes of the USSR and tbe other 
Easte.r.n Eu:r.0pe?.n countries to the European Conununi ty within the con text of 
~SCE. First, on t.he political and ideological levels, they are \4rorried 
that~ ~::·;E Comr.wn.~ 'cy Il1ight become a "super-power", especially through the 
. . . - , . ._. l _, 'l"t t (l) s d th acqu:;.s1.t:.on 01: po ... l.c.l.Ca a;1 .... m1 1. ary compe ences. econ , e 
Eastern E11ropectn c,')untries wish to obtain both freer access to the 
markets of the CoJnmunity countries and advanced technological and 
industrial help from the Nine. 
59. This report does not examine the Eastern European attitude to the 
Community in depth in the light of the work being carried out by Mr Jahn 
for the Political Affairs Committee in his Opinion addressed to the 
Committee on External Economic Relations on the relations of the 
Europear. Communities vri th the USSR and Cornecon (PE 32. 956/rev. 2) . 
NonetheJess, it is useful to note some of the salient factors in the 
recent developmer"t of Eastern European attitudes. Until recently ideology 
has prevented tl.e Comecon countries from making formal approaches to the 
Community, but in February 1972 Roumania requested the EEC Council to 
include her amongst the (less developed) countries which benefit from 
generalised preferences. Although Eastern European attacks on the effects 
of Community policy on East/West trade have become more subdued in recent 
years, the view that the tariffs and quotas imposed by the Community on 
imports from third countries constitute "discrimination" is still widely 
held in Eastern E1uope. 
60. The speech of Mr Brezhnev to the Trade Union Council in Moscow on 
20 March 1972 was something of a turning point. In this speech 
acknowledging the reality of the Common Market and its evolution he stressed 
that the condition for better relations between Eastern Europe and the Nine 
(l) A -::~rpical illustra-tion of this view is found in an article by 
Mr And=ezj Towpik in Spratty Miedzynarodowe, Warsaw, January 1972, arguing 
that the development of the European Community into a super-power would not 
help t'!l'2 development of all European relations and could be regarded as 
being a new form of Western European "imperialism". 
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was that Community countries should "recognize ~he realities existing 
in the socialist part of Europe, specifically, the interests of the 
Member countries of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance. We are 
for equality in economic relations and against discrimination". 
61. On 21 December of the same year Mr Brezhnev again spoke of EEC. 
He stated : "Can bases be found for some form of practical relations 
between the trade and economic organisations existing in Europe, between 
Comecon and the Common Market? Probably they can, if the states 
belonging to the Common Market refrain from any attempts at discrimination 
against the other side, if they will contribute towards the development 
of natural bilateral relations and cooperation throughout Europe". 
62. A practical demonstration of changing Eastern European attitudes 
towards EEC was reflected by the visit of MrFedayQv, Secretary-General 
of Comecon, to Copenhagen, during the Danish Presidency of the Council, 
to discuss possible EEC-Comecon links with the then Danish Foreign Minister, 
Mr Andersen. This visit proved somewhat abortive -probably because it 
took the Council somewhat by surprise - but it seems probable that further 
contacts will be developed between the two economic groups with a view to 
exploring possible forms of relationship. 
63. At this point your Rapporteur wishes to stress that in his view it 
would be unwise for the Community, on its side, to insist that contacts 
between EEC and Comecon should develop either with Comecon as an entity 
or on the basis of separate negotiations between EEC and individual 
Eastern European countries. The great differences that underlie the 
multilateralism of the Community and that of Comecon should not be for-
gotten. It might therefore be wise for the Community not to try to force 
a particular approach on the members of Comecon (apart from the basic fact 
that they must negotiate with the Community and not with its individual 
governments) but to react pragmatically to Eastern approaches as they 
arise, especially in view of the complex internal political dynamics 
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of Eastern Europe. (1) Meanwhile, the main problem is to determine which 
specific questions could be the most appropriate subject of negotiations. 
64. Finally, to return to the context of CSCE, it is noteworthy that 
neither the Soviet Union nor other Warsaw Pact or Comecon members have ( 2) 
challenged the right of the Nine to speak, and act collectively at Helsinki 
or Geneva. Thus, the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries 
have tacitly recognised the international status of the Nine and their 
right to act as an entity in international political and security as well 
(3) 
as economic negotiations. This represents a major step forward in 
Community/Eastern European relations. 
(l) 
( 2) 
(3) 
On 13 March 1974 Sir Christopher Soames, the competent member of the 
Commission, agreed with the suggestion made to him by Mr Jahn during 
Parliament's Question Time, that Eastern European contacts with the 
Commission might take both a multilateral and/or bilateral form if this 
were preferred by the Comecon members. On ll February 1974, 
Mr Dahrendorf, and on 13 March 1974 Sir Christopher Soames, stressed 
that future Comecon approaches to the Community should be addressed to 
the Commission as the competent institution. The Danish Ambassador 
in Moscow, as a representative of the President of the Council, 
informed Mr Fedayev, in September 1973, that should Comecon wish to 
engage in further contacts with the Community it should do so with 
the Commission. At the end of September 1974 Mr Fedayev, Secretary-
General of Comecon, invited Mr Ortoli, President of the Commission of 
the European Communities, to Moscow for discussions. 
Barring a limited number of 1ndividual protests concerning the 
participation of the Commission in Committee II at the beginning of 
the second stage. 
Confirming and enlarging precedents established in a more purely 
commercial sense within GATT. 
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X CONCLUSIONS 
65. A considerable number of conclusions could be suggested with respect 
to how the fifteen members of the North Atlantic Alliance, Western 
participants in general, or individual Western countries might wish to 
appraise CSCE and its possible results. However, in the context of th1s 
report it seems wiser to concentrate on conclusions of specific interest 
to the Nine Members of the European Community. As mentioned earlier in 
this report, two definite conclusions emerge with regard to the Community's 
interests. First, any follow-up negotiations with the Eastern European 
participants concerning issues for which the competence has been transferred 
from the individual Member States of the Community to the Commission, under 
the Treaties, must be conducted not with the member governments but with 
the Commission itself. Second, the Member States of the Community must 
continue to make it clear that although they are prepared to develop 
closer commercial and other relationships with the countries of Eastern 
Europe, for the Nine the development of Western European integration must 
have priority over East/West cooperation. If this is recognised by the 
Eastern European countries there should be no inconsistency between the 
goals of Western integration and East/West cooperation. Finally, two 
more general points. It is in concerting joint policies towards all the 
major issues arising at CSCE that the political cooperation process of 
the Nine has proved more successful than in dealing with any other political 
problem so far. Also, at CSCE the USSR and its Warsaw Pact Allies have 
tacitly recognised the Nine to be their interlocateur valable in dealing 
with major problems of East/West economic cooperation. 
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